Manchester Arena Public Inquiry

This section addressed the security arrangements and missed opportunities for detecting and stopping Salman Abedi or reducing the harm he caused.

The findings of this volume were published in June 2021 and highlighted failures relating to implementing proper security; the training of security guards; the recruitment of appropriate staff; planning for events; event risk assessments; monitoring of the site; CCTV monitoring and the failure to identify the blind spot in which Salman Abedi hid before detonating his bomb.

Following the publication of the first volume of findings, Neil Hudgell, executive chairman of Hudgell Solicitors, and part of our Manchester Arena Inquiry legal team, said;

This inquiry has strongly demonstrated that there was an inexcusable catalogue of failings at every level which made the venue an attractive target to a terrorist attack, failed to deter or prevent the outrage, and as a result contributed to the loss of life and injury.

Significantly, at the time, despite the country’s national threat level for a terrorist attack being classed as severe, the Government did not have laws in place to enforce venues such as the Manchester Arena and other concert venues to take appropriate counter-terrorism measures in such an environment.

As a result of these combined failings, thousands of young people who attended the concert on that night were left an open and vulnerable target for terrorists because the security around the venue and event was nowhere near what it needed to be. There were gaps and failings galore.

This volume dealt with the emergency response to the attack and examined the planning and preparation by the responders. The report was published on November 3, 2022, and included 149 recommendations.

Inquiry chairman Sir John Saunders said “significant aspects” of the emergency response “went wrong” and concluded that it was likely that failings had prevented 28-year-old John Atkinson’s survival.

He said he could not rule out the possibility that the youngest victim of the attack, eight-year-old Saffie-Rose Roussos, could have been saved with better treatment.

Following the publication of the second volume of findings, Neil Hudgell, executive chairman and part of our Manchester Arena Inquiry legal team, said: “When the bomb was detonated, a well-organised, reactive, properly co-ordinated, decisive and brave response was needed at speed. Those injured sadly got an emergency response which was completely under-planned and ill-prepared, which was chaotically led, hesitant, and fearful.

It left seriously injured people feeling abandoned and alone during the most terrifying moments of their lives, denying some the chance of coming away from the attack with their lives intact. The response was simply shameful.

There was no clear communication across emergency services to enable decisive decision-making to be made. This ultimately resulted in the rescue of people from inside the area not being made the number one priority. How can that be the basis of any major incident response, where it is known there have been multiple life-threatening injuries and deaths?

People who could potentially have been saved lost their lives whilst emergency crews were held outside for their own safety. It was therefore left to ordinary members of the public, many badly injured themselves, to help others.

Chairman Sir John Saunders said MI5 missed a “significant” opportunity to take action that might have prevented Abedi from carrying out the attack.

In the months leading up to the attack, security services had obtained two key pieces of intelligence about Abedi but did not share them with local counterterrorism police,

Had they done so, Abedi could have been subject to a “port stop” under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 when he flew into Manchester Airport from Libya on 18 May 2017.

Sir John said it has been a “real possibility” that Abedi had the switch for the bomb used in the attack in his possession at the airport.